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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, to prove aggravated identity theft
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), the Government must
show that the defendant knew that the means of
identification he used belonged to another person.

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................iii
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.............. 1
OPINION BELOW....................................................... 1
JURISDICTION........................................................... 1
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION.................... 1
STATEMENT............................................................... 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................. 7
I.

Six Courts Of Appeals Are Evenly Divided
Over The Scope Of The Mens Rea
Requirement Of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). ............ 8

II. A Defendant Does Not Knowingly Commit
Aggravated Identity Theft Unless He Knows
That The Means Of Identification He Is Using
Belongs To Another Person................................. 16
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 28
APPENDIX
Court of Appeals Decision .................................. 1a
Judgment ............................................................ 4a

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81 (1955) .................................................. 27
Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419 (1985) ........................................ passim
Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103 (1990) ................................................ 21
United States v. Godin,
476 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Me. 2007) ............................ 20
United States v. Godin, No. 07-2332,
2008 WL 2780646 (1st Cir. July 18, 2008) .... passim
United States v. Hurt,
527 F.3d 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .............................. 24
United States v. Hurtado,
508 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008) ............... passim
United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez,
520 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. July 15, 2008) (No. 08-5316) ........ passim
United States v. Miranda-Lopez,
No. 07-50123, 2008 WL 2762392
(9th Cir. July 17, 2008) ............................ 8, 9, 10, 13
United States v. Montejo,
442 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2006) .......................... passim
United States v. Santos,
128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008) ............................................ 27
United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo,
515 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ...................... passim

iv
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. 64 (1994) .................................................. 20
Statutes
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) ............................................ 17, 19
8 U.S.C. § 1325............................................................. 4
18 U.S.C. § 1028A ............................................. passim
§ 1028A(a)(1)................................................. passim
§ 1028A(a)(2)................................................... 22, 23
§ 1028A(c)(1) ......................................................... 14
§ 1028A(c)(2) ......................................................... 14
§ 1028A(c)(3) ......................................................... 14
§ 1028A(c)(7) ......................................................... 14
18 U.S.C. § 1546..................................................... 4, 25
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).................................................. 19
Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,
H.R. 1731, 108th Cong. (2004)............................... 24
Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) ...................... 24
Model Penal Code (1985) ....................................... 9, 22
Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a
Balance Between Privacy and Commercial and
Governmental Use, Before the Subcomm. on
Corrections and Rehabilitation of the S. Comm
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) .................... 14
W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed.
2003) ................................................................. 18, 24

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Ignacio Flores-Figueroa respectfully
petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit (Pet. App. 1a-3a), is
unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on April 23, 2008. Pet. App. 1a. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION
In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A provides:
§ 1028A. Aggravated identity theft
(a) Offenses.-(1) In general.—Whoever, during and in
relation to any felony violation enumerated in
subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such felony, be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.
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STATEMENT
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) imposes a mandatory
consecutive two-year sentence enhancement on
anyone who, during and in relation to certain
enumerated
offenses,
“knowingly
transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means
of identification of another person. . . .”1 In this case,
1 The enumerated offenses are listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(c) and include violations of:

(1) section 641 (relating to theft of public
money, property, or rewards[1]), section 656
(relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication
by bank officer or employee), or section 664 (relating
to theft from employee benefit plans);
(2) section 911 (relating to false personation of
citizenship);
(3) section 922 (a)(6) (relating to false
statements in connection with the acquisition of a
firearm);
(4) any provision contained in this chapter
(relating to fraud and false statements), other than
this section or section 1028(a)(7);
(5) any provision contained in chapter 63
(relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud);
(6) any provision contained in chapter 69
(relating to nationality and citizenship).
(7) any provision contained in chapter 75
(relating to passports and visas);
(8) section 523 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(15 U.S.C. 6823) (relating to obtaining customer
information by false pretenses);
(9) section 243 or 266 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253 and 1306) (relating
to willfully failing to leave the United States after
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petitioner acknowledged using, without lawful
authority, false Social Security and Alien
Registration numbers in order to obtain employment.
However, he denied (without contradiction by the
Government) knowing that the false identification
numbers in fact belonged to some other actual
person, as opposed to simply being fabricated
numbers never issued by the Government to a real
person.
The question presented by this petition, upon
which the courts of appeals are extensively divided, is
whether a defendant “knowingly . . . uses, without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person” within the meaning of Section 1028A(a)(1)
when he does not know that the identification he is
using in fact belongs to another person.
1. On April 17, 2000, petitioner, a citizen of
Mexico, used a false Social Security number and
Resident Alien card to obtain employment at a steel
company. U.S. C.A. Br. 3. At the time, petitioner
used the name Horatio Ramirez, but neither the

deportation and creating
registration card);

a

counterfeit

alien

(10) any provision contained in chapter 8 of title II
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1321
et seq.) (relating to various immigration offenses); or
(11) section 208, 811, 1107(b), 1128B(a), or 1632 of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 408, 1011, 1307(b),
1320a–7b(a), and 1383a) (relating to false statements
relating to programs under the Act).
[1] So in original. Probably should be “records”.
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Social Security number nor the Resident Alien card
had been issued to anyone of that name. Id. at 1, 5.
In fact, the Social Security number was invalid. Id.
at 5.2
In 2006, petitioner desired to begin working
under his real name. He presented his employer
with a new Social Security number, purportedly
issued under petitioner’s name, and a Permanent
Resident card with his name and a registration
number. U.S. C.A. Br. 3. Both documents were
forgeries purchased by petitioner from an individual
in Chicago. Id. at 5-6. Suspicious, the company’s
owner reported the request to U.S. Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
The ICE investigation revealed that none of the
documents were issued to either petitioner or to his
former alias, Horatio Ramirez. Instead, the Social
Security card bearing petitioner’s name used a
number issued to a minor. U.S. C.A. Br. 5.
The
Permanent Resident card likewise bore a number
that was issued to someone else. Id.3
3. In early 2006, a federal grand jury indicted
petitioner on two counts of Misuse of an Immigration
Document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, and one
count of Illegal Entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
The grand jury also indicted petitioner on two counts
of Aggravated Identity Theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2 The record does not disclose whether the Resident Alien
card number was valid or not.
3 The record does not disclose any further details about the
persons whose Social Security and Permanent Resident
numbers were used on the cards bearing petitioner’s name.
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§ 1028A, arising from his use of the Social Security
and Permanent Resident cards purportedly issued in
his own name.4 Pet. App. 2a; U.S. C.A. Br. 1.
Petitioner pled guilty to both counts of Misuse of an
Immigration Document and the sole count of Illegal
Entry. Petitioner pled not guilty to the two counts of
Aggravated Identity Theft and consented to a bench
trial. U.S. C.A. Br. 1.
At trial, petitioner admitted that the documents
were never issued to him, but testified that he
purchased the identification documents without any
knowledge that the numbers they bore belonged to
real people. U.S. C.A. Br. 5.
At the close of evidence, petitioner argued that
the Government had failed to prove aggravated
identity theft because it had not presented any
evidence to contradict his testimony that he did not
know that the means of identification he had used
belonged to “another person,” as required by Section
1028A(a)(1). Pet. App. 2a. The district court rejected
petitioner’s construction of the statute, agreeing with
the Government that no such proof was required.
Accordingly, the court found petitioner guilty and
sentenced him to seventy-five months imprisonment,
twenty-four of which were the result of the Section
1028A enhancement. Id. at 2a-3a.
4 Because the original Social Security card bearing the
name Horatio Ramirez did not, in fact, belong to “another
person,” as required by Section 1028A(a)(1), petitioner was not
charged with Aggravated Identity Theft with respect to that
document.
Likewise, petitioner was not charged with
Aggravated Identity Theft with respect to the original false
Resident Alien card.
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4. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the
Eighth Circuit, renewing his argument that § 1028A
requires proof that the defendant knew that the
identification he used belongs to another person. Pet.
App. 3a. The court of appeals summarily affirmed,
explaining that it had recently “resolved this issue
and determined that under the plain language of the
statute, ‘knowingly’ modified only the verbs
‘transfers, possesses, or uses,’ and not the phrase ‘of
another person.’”
Id. (citing United States v.
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 15, 2008) (No. 085316)).
In that prior decision, the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that its construction of the statute,
while consistent with the law of the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits, conflicts with a decision of the
D.C. Circuit. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915-16
(citing United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d
1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Hurtado, 508
F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442
F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2006)).
5. This petition followed.
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case presents the Court an opportunity to
resolve an ever-widening circuit split on an important
and recurring question of federal law. Indeed, in the
five days prior to the filing of this petition, the
division over the mens rea requirement of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), has grown from the 3-1 split
acknowledged by the Eighth Circuit at the time of
petitioner’s appeal to a 3-3 conflict that shows no sign
of abating.
Three courts of appeals now hold that
“aggravated identity theft” under Section 1028A(a)(1)
occurs only when the defendant knows that the
means of identification he is using in fact belongs to
another person.
Three other circuits hold the
opposite. This division of authority is considered,
entrenched, and untenable. The question presented
arises frequently, particularly in the context of
immigration prosecutions when, as in this case, a
defendant seeking employment obtains a false Social
Security number without knowing whether the
number is simply made up and belongs to no one, or
in fact matches the number assigned by the
Government to another person.
The continued
disparate application of the severe penalties of
Section 1028A(a)(1) to similarly situated defendants
should not endure. Accordingly, this Court should
grant certiorari in this case to resolve the conflict and
restore uniformity to this important area of federal
law.
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I.

Six Courts Of Appeals Are Evenly Divided
Over The Scope Of The Mens Rea
Requirement Of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).

1. In the past two years, six courts of appeals
have considered the mens rea requirement of Section
1028A(a)(1), dividing evenly into two diametrically
opposed camps.
First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. The First,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have each held that the
knowledge requirement of Section 1028A(a)(1)
extends to the “of another person” element of the
offense, requiring the Government to prove that the
defendant did not simply invent a false identification
number in cases such as this, but knew that he was
using the means of identification belonging to
another actual person. See United States v. Godin,
No. 07-2332, 2008 WL 2780646, at *1 (1st Cir. July
18, 2008) (“[W]e hold that the ‘knowingly’ mens rea
requirement extends to ‘of another person.’ In other
words, to obtain a conviction under § 1028A(a)(1), the
government must prove that the defendant knew that
the means of identification transferred, possessed, or
used during the commission of an enumerated felony
belonged to another person.”); United States v.
Miranda-Lopez, No. 07-50123, 2008 WL 2762392, at
*5 (9th Cir. July 17, 2008) (“[W]e thus hold that the
government was required to prove that MirandaLopez knew that the identification belonged to
another person.”); United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo,
515 F.3d 1234, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e hold that
section 1028A(a)(1)’s mens rea requirement extends
to the phrase ‘of another person,’ meaning that the
government must prove the defendant actually knew
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the identification in question belonged to someone
else.”).
These courts have rejected the assertion that the
word “knowingly” should be read as modifying only
the verbs that follow it. The D.C. Circuit, for
example, has pointed out that “the Model Penal Code
adopts as a general principle of construction a rule
under which, absent evidence to the contrary, the
mens rea requirement encompasses all material
elements of an offense.” Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d
at 1239 (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(4) (1985)).
See also Godin, 2008 WL 2780646, at *4 (“In criminal
statutes, adverbs that are also mens rea
requirements frequently extend to non-verbs.”)
(collecting examples).
In fact, the D.C. Circuit
observed that even the Government admitted that
the knowledge requirement of Section 1028A(a)(1)
extends beyond the verbs in the provision, requiring
proof at the very least that the defendant knew that
what he was using was a “means of identification.”
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238.
Whether the knowledge requirement extends all
the way to the phrase “of another person,” these
three circuits have found, is a question upon which
the statutory text is ambiguous. See Godin, 2008 WL
2780646, at *5; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392, at
*4; Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1243.
That
conclusion, these courts believe, is supported by this
Court’s decision in Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419 (1985), which found that a similar
formulation was “ambiguous” “[a]s a matter of
grammar” because “it is not at all clear how far down
the sentence the word ‘knowingly’ is intended to
travel.” Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424-25 n.7; see
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Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1241; Godin, 2008 WL
2780646, at *5; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392,
at *3-*4.
Turning to other indicia of legislative intent,
these circuits have noted that the structure, title
(“Aggravated identity theft”), and basic purposes of
the provision (as illustrated in the legislative history)
either undermine the Government’s reading or do not
resolve the textual ambiguity. The D.C. Circuit has
concluded that these sources show that the essence of
the crime defined in Section 1028A(a)(1) is
intentional theft and that when a defendant simply
acquires an identification number (like a made-up
Social Security number) that fortuitously belongs to
someone else, “it is odd – and borders on the absurd –
to call what [the defendant] did ‘theft.’” 515 F.3d at
1246 (citation omitted). The First and Ninth Circuits
have agreed that the legislative history tends to
support this view, but ultimately concluded that the
history as a whole was inconclusive. Godin, 2008 WL
2780646, at *7-*8; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392,
at *4.
Because they found the text of the statute
ambiguous – and concluded that the structure,
history, and purposes of the provision failed to
resolve the ambiguity – the First and Ninth Circuits
applied the rule of lenity to decide the statutory
question in favor of the defendant. Godin, 2008 WL
2780646, at *8; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392 at
*5. Although the D.C. Circuit reached the same
conclusion based on its reading of the text in light of
the statute’s structure, purposes, and legislative
history, Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246, it also
stated that “if we harbored any doubt about this . . .
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we would turn to the rule of lenity to resolve the
dispute,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Three
other circuits have considered the same essential
arguments and reached the opposite conclusion. See
United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912,
915 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the Government
was not required to prove that Mendoza-Gonzalez
knew that [the person whose name and social
security number he used] was a real person to prove
he violated § 1028A(a)(1)”), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. July 15, 2008) (No. 08-5316); United States v.
Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 610 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (holding that that “§ 1028A(a)(1) [does] not
require the government to prove that [a defendant]
knew that the means of identification he possessed
and used belonged to another actual person”), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v.
Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
that “the defendant need not be aware of the actual
assignment of the [identification] numbers to an
individual to have violated the statute”).
These courts have reasoned that the adverb
“knowingly” is most sensibly read as modifying solely
the verbs that follow – “transfers, possesses, or uses”
– and not the broader object of those verbs (i.e.,
“means of identification of another person”). See
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915; Hurtado, 508
F.3d at 609; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215. The courts
have acknowledged that this Court has given a
broader reach to the knowingness requirement of
similarly structured statutory provisions in cases like
Liparota. But they distinguish such cases as resting
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on a concern, absent here, about criminalizing
otherwise innocent conduct. See Mendoza-Gonzalez,
520 F.3d at 917; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609-10;
Montejo, 442 F.3d at 216.
All three circuits thus have found the statute
unambiguous. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 916;
Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 610 n.8; Montejo, 442 F.3d at
217.
Thus, none relies on legislative history,
although the Eighth Circuit has indicated that it
would view that history as supporting its reading of
the text. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 916-17.
And because they found the text of the statute clear,
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have declined to
apply the rule of lenity to construe the statute in a
manner more favorable to defendants. Hurtado, 508
F.3d at 610 n.8; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217.
2. Writing separately in Godin, Judge Lynch
persuasively argued that the time has come for this
Court to resolve the circuit conflict:
It would be beneficial if the Supreme Court
resolved the mens rea issue. The circuit
conflict is certainly ripe. And there are a
large number of district court opinions on the
issue. The issue is important and affects a
large number of cases and a large number of
defendants. For each of those defendants, an
additional mandatory two-year sentence
makes a great deal of difference.
2008 WL 2780646, at * 10 (Lynch, C.J., concurring).
This Court should heed Judge Lynch’s call. The
circuit conflict is considered, mature, and ripe for
resolution. Each of the six circuits has given the
question
presented
extensive,
thoughtful
consideration. The courts have acknowledged each
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other’s holdings and reasoning, but have been unable
to agree on the meaning of the statute.5 As a result,
there is no reasonable prospect that the division will
be resolved without this Court’s intervention.
Indeed, two of the circuits have denied petitions for
rehearing en banc, one on each side of the split. See
United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234
(D.C. Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, (June 13,
2008); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d
912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, (May 1,
2008).
5 See Godin, 2008 WL 2780646, at * 3 (First Circuit noting
that the “circuits are divided on the issue” and citing the
decisions of the Fourth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits); id.
at *4 (explaining basis for its disagreement with the Fourth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); id. at *6-*8 (disagreeing with
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the provision’s structure, title,
and legislative history resolve the ambiguity); Miranda-Lopez,
2008 WL 2762392, at *4 (Ninth Circuit acknowledging split
between D.C. Circuit and the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits, and declaring that “we follow the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning”); Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915-16 (Eighth
Circuit noting decisions of the Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits); id. at 916 (“We acknowledge that we have reached a
different conclusion than the D.C. Circuit” and explaining why);
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1242 (D.C. Circuit acknowledging
“that the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
[Montejo]” and that “the Eleventh Circuit, along with several
district courts, has adopted this interpretation,” but concluding
that “[w]e respectfully disagree with Montejo” and explaining
why); Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609 (finding support in the Fourth
Circuit’s resolution of the question). Moreover, two of the
decisions have generated dissents, further airing the arguments
in favor of the conflicting readings of the statutes. See MirandaLopez, 2008 WL 2762392, at *7-*10 (Bybee, J., dissenting);
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1250-61 (Henderson, J.,
dissenting).
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Moreover, no purpose would be served by further
percolation.
By and large, the decisions have
addressed the same set of arguments regarding the
text, purposes and legislative history of the Act, as
well as the meaning of this Court’s decisions in cases
like Liparota.
Given the thoroughness of the
opinions already issued, it is unlikely that future
decisions in other circuits will shed significant light
on the debate.
In addition, as Judge Lynch observed, the
question is recurring and important:
A large number of cases are involved. The
range of underlying felonies that can trigger
this offense is broad. To give but a few
examples of the scope of the issue, this
offense can be charged when an unlawful
means of identification is used in the course
of Social Security fraud, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(c)(11),
passport
fraud,
id.
§ 1028A(c)(7), theft of public property, id.
§ 1028A(c)(1), fraud in the acquisition of a
firearm, id. § 1028A(c)(3) , citizenship fraud,
id. § 1028A(c)(2), and other crimes.
Godin, 2008 WL 2780646, at *10 (Lynch, C.J.,
concurring). In 2005, an FBI official testified before
Congress that the Bureau had over 1600 open
investigations into identity theft and expected the
number of grow.6 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising
6 See Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a Balance
Between Privacy and Commercial and Governmental Use, Before
the Subcomm. on Corrections and Rehabilitation of the S. Comm
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement of Chris
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division,
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that six circuits have addressed the meaning of
Section 1028A(a)(1)’s mens rea requirement in the
past two years alone.
Finally, the present division of authority is unfair
and untenable. Individuals committing precisely the
same acts are subject to significantly different
sentences depending on accidents of geography. The
disparity is exacerbated by the fact that Congress
took pains to ensure that defendants subject to
Section 1028A(a)(1) would serve the entirety of the
two-year additional sentence on top of the sentence
received for their predicate offense. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(b)
(requiring
sentence
be
served
consecutively to any other sentence and prohibiting
courts from placing defendants convicted under this
provision on probation).
If the Government’s
construction of the statute is wrong, defendants in
three circuits are serving sentences substantially
harsher than Congress intended. On the other hand,
if the Government’s view is correct, Congress’s intent
to harshly punish aggravated identity theft often will
be thwarted, including in the Ninth Circuit, the most
populous circuit in the country.
3.
This case presents an ideal vehicle for
resolving the circuit conflict. The statutory question
was the principal basis for dispute in the district
court and the sole question presented on appeal. Pet.
App. 3a. Moreover, the question is dispositive of
petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner does not dispute
that his conviction was lawful unless the Government
Federal
Bureau
of
Investigation),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1437&wit_id=4162.
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was required to prove that he knew that the Social
Security or Permanent Resident registration number
he used belonged to another actual person. At the
same time, the Government acknowledged on appeal
that petitioner “testified that he purchased the
means of identification in Chicago and did not know
that they were issued to real people.” U.S. CA Br. 6.
And the Government did not claim to have presented
any evidence to contradict that testimony at trial.
II. A Defendant Does Not Knowingly Commit
Aggravated Identity Theft Unless He Knows
That The Means Of Identification He Is
Using Belongs To Another Person.
Certiorari is also warranted because the decision
below is wrong, conflicting with both the best reading
of Section 1028A(a)(1) and the rule of lenity.
1. The text of Section 1028A(a)(1) is ambiguous
as to the scope of its knowledge requirement. The
word “knowingly” could apply to one or more of four
aspects of the offense, as the provision applies to
anyone who “knowingly [1] transfers, posseses, or
uses, [2] without lawful authority, [3] a means of
identification [4] of another person.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1).
It is at least grammatically possible that the
provision requires only that the defendant knew that
his actions constituted “transferring, possessing, or
using” something, and that Congress did not care
whether the defendant knew that the thing was a
means of identification, or that he lacked lawful
authority for his action, or that the identification
belonged to someone else.
But this Court’s
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precedents demonstrate that this is surely not the
only, or even the most plausible, reading.
Confronted with a similarly constructed provision
in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), this
Court recognized the inherent textual ambiguity in
such formulations. There, the Court construed a
statute criminally punishing anyone who “knowingly
uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses [food
stamps] in any manner not authorized by” law. Id. at
420 n.1 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)). The
Government argued that the prosecution was
required to prove only that the defendant knowingly
“use[d], transfer[ed], acquire[d], alter[ed], or
possesse[d]” the food stamps in a manner that –
known to the defendant or not – happened to violate
federal law. Id. at 423. The defendant argued that
the knowledge requirement extended through the
entire clause, requiring the Government to show that
he also knew that the manner in which he using the
food stamps was not authorized by law.
Id.
Importantly for the present discussion, the Court
found the language of the statute – which took the
same form as Section 1028A(a)(1), using “knowingly”
before a series of verbs followed by a direct object and
a further limiting phrase – to be grammatically
ambiguous:
Although Congress certainly intended by use
of the word “knowingly” to require some
mental state with respect to some element of
the crime defined in § 2024(b)(1), the
interpretations proffered by both parties
accord with congressional intent to this
extent. Beyond this, the words themselves
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provide little guidance. Either interpretation
would accord with ordinary usage.
471 U.S. at 424 (emphasis in original). The Court
then noted that one “treatise has aptly summed up
the ambiguity in an analogous situation:”
Still further difficulty arises from the
ambiguity which frequently exists concerning
what the words or phrases in question
modify. What, for instance, does “knowingly”
modify in a sentence from a “blue sky” law
criminal statute punishing one who
‘knowingly sells a security without a permit’
from the securities commissioner? To be
guilty must the seller of a security without a
permit know only that what he is doing
constitutes a sale, or must he also know that
the thing he sells is a security, or must he
also know that he has no permit to sell the
security he sells? As a matter of grammar the
statute is ambiguous; it is not at all clear how
far down the sentence the word “knowingly”
is intended to travel – whether it modifies
“sells,” or “sells a security,” or “sells a security
without a permit.”
Id. at 424 n.7 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law § 27 (1972)).
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
nonetheless have insisted that the text of Section
1028A(a)(1) is unambiguous, but their reasons are
unpersuasive.
These courts have asserted that
because “knowingly” is an adverb, and located
proximate to the words “transfers, possesses, or
uses,” it must be understood to apply only to those
verbs.
See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915;
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Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 309; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215.
But this Court recognized in Liparota that this is not
true. 471 U.S. at 424 (noting of similarly constructed
provision, “the words themselves provide little
guidance” as to the reach of the knowingness
requirement).7 As the First Circuit rightly observed,
“[c]ases holding that ‘knowingly’ extends to words
and phrases other than verbs are legion.” Godin,
2008 WL 2780646, at * 4 (collecting cases). To take
but one example, no one could reasonably think that
the federal statute criminalizing “knowingly . . .
possess[ing] with intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, a controlled substance,” 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), would apply to a delivery truck driver
who knew he was transporting for distribution some
kind of substance, but did not know that the sealed
packaged in his vehicle contained cocaine. Yet that
would be the consequence of a rule applying the
7 The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits insist that
Liparota is inapposite because its construction of the knowledge
requirement in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) was intended to avoid
criminalizing innocent conduct. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at
917; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 213. That
description of the basis of the Court’s decisions is incorrect; the
Court made clear that the concern about innocent conduct was
simply one of several factors, including the rule of lenity,
supporting its holding. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426-27. But more
importantly for present purposes, it was only because the Court
found the text of the statute ambiguous that it was required to
turn to other considerations like lenity and avoiding the
criminalization of seemingly innocent conduct. Id. at 424. That
textual conclusion was driven by the Court’s recognition of the
inherent ambiguity of the formulation used in the statute before
it – a formulation repeated in Section 1028A(a)(1) – rather than
by any policy concern. Id. at 424-25, 430.
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adverb “knowingly” only to the verbs in Section
841(a)(1).
Equally absurd results would follow from
applying the knowledge requirement of Section
1028A(a)(1) only to the provision’s verbs. Take, for
example, a person who knowingly transfers an
envelope from one person to another, having been
told, and in fact reasonably believing, that it contains
a birthday card when it really contains a stolen
Social Security card. See United States v. Godin, 476
F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D. Me. 2007). If the knowledge
requirement in Section 1028A(a)(1) extends only to
the provision’s verbs, criminal liability would attach.
But not even the Government believes that this is a
sensible reading of the statute. In the D.C. Circuit
the Government acknowledged that “the mens rea
requirement must extend at least to the direct
object’s principal modifier, ‘of identification.’”
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238.
Having made that reasonable concession, it is
difficult to see how the Government can maintain
that, as a linguistic matter, the knowledge
requirement can only be read to extend to “means of
identification” but not to the qualifying phrase “of
another person.” That is, once the word “knowingly”
is “emancipated from merely modifying the verbs,”
then “as a matter of grammar it is difficult to
conclude that the word ‘knowingly’ modifies one of
the elements in [the subsection,] but not the other.”
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,
77-78 (1994). At the very least, the reach of the
knowledge requirement is textually ambiguous.
The circuits accepting the Government’s
construction have also noted that Congress could
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have written the provision to unambiguously extend
the knowledge requirement to the “of another person
element.” See, e.g., Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at
915; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609. Congress could, for
example, have applied the provisions to one who
“knowingly transfers, posses, or uses, what he knows
to be a means of identification belong to another
known person, knowing that he lacked lawful
authority to do so.” But that kind of repetition is
awkward and inconsistent with common usage, as
would be a provision making abundantly clear that
the knowledge requirement applies only to the verbs
(e.g., “knowingly transfers, posses, or uses something
which, whether known to him or not, is a means of
identification of another person used without lawful
authority”). In the end, the construction Congress
did use is consistent with common usage, but
inherently ambiguous.
2.
This Court must resolve the statutory
ambiguity in favor of lenity unless “resort to ‘the
language and structure, legislative history, and
motivating policies’ of the statute” removes all
“reasonable doubt . . . about [the] statute’s intended
scope.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108
(1990); see, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427. In this
case, those considerations support the interpretation
lenity would otherwise require.
a. Legal Backdrop. Section 1028A(a)(1) must be
read in light of a legal tradition that ordinarily
imputes the mens rea requirement of a statute to
each of its elements, unless there is some good reason
to do otherwise. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(4)
(1985) (“When the law defining an offense prescribes
the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
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commission of an offense, without distinguishing
among the material elements thereof, such provision
shall apply to all the material elements of the offense,
unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”); XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 70 (reading criminal
statute in light of “our cases interpreting criminal
statutes to include broadly applicable scienter
requirements”) (emphasis added). To be sure, that
presumption can be overcome, but as discussed next,
nothing in the structure, history, or purposes of the
statute points strongly in favor of an unusual reading
here.
b. Structure.
The subsection
following Section 1028A(a)(1) provides:

immediately

(2) Terrorism offense.--Whoever, during and
in relation to any felony violation enumerated
in
section
2332b(g)(5)(B),
knowingly
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of
another person or a false identification
document shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such felony, be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5
years.
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Two aspects of this provision render the
Government’s construction of Section 1028A(a)(1)
untenable.
First, the italicized language makes clear that in
the case of terrorism offenses, it is enough that the
defendant knew that his identification document was
false, regardless of whether or not he knew that the
identification belonged to another person. Congress
thus knew how to make irrelevant the defendant’s
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knowledge of whether the identification he used
belonged to another, and did so in an immediately
adjoining subsection of the statute.
Second, in the D.C. Circuit, the Government
conceded that the knowledge requirement in the
terrorism offense provision extended to the phrase
“false identification document,” such that the
defendant would have to know that the document
was false in order to commit the offense under that
prong of the provision. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at
129. But that concession requires the Court to
believe one of two implausible propositions: (a) that
the knowledge requirement in Section 1028A(a)(2)
hopscotches among the provision’s various elements,
landing on the verbs and the words “means of
identification” before leaping over “of another person”
to alight on “false identification document”; or (b)
that the knowledge requirement applies to the “of
another person” element in the terrorism offense
provision but not in its immediate predecessor
provision, Section 1028A(a)(1). Because identical
neighboring clauses in a statute should be read in a
consistent manner, neither view is plausible.
c.
Purposes and Legislative History.
The
purposes and legislative history of the provision
further support petitioner’s reading. The title of the
provision is “Aggravated identity theft,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A. The word “theft” implies the knowing
acquisition of the property of another.8 Thus, for
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “theft” as the “felonious
taking and removing of another's personal property with the
intent of depriving the true owner of it.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1516 (8th ed. 2004).
8
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example, one who takes in a cat, believing that it is a
stray, does not commit “theft” as commonly
understood simply because it turns out that the cat in
fact belongs to someone else.
It is the thief’s
knowledge that the taken property belongs to another
that distinguishes misappropriation from thievery.
See, e.g., United States v. Hurt, 527 F.3d 1347, 1350
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (theft requires specific intent to take
possession of the property of another); W. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law § 19.5(a) (2d ed. 2003)
(same). Likewise, when a person makes up a Social
Security number, having no idea whether it belongs
to someone else, it is hard to see how that conduct
qualifies as “theft” – much less “aggravated theft” –
within the ordinary meaning of those terms.
The legislative history likewise demonstrates
that Congress was focused on the problem of
intentional identity theft, not unintentional
misappropriation. Pursuant to the Identity Theft
Penalty Enhancement Act, H.R. 1731, 108th Cong.
(2004), in 2004 Congress modified § 1028A to
“address[] the growing problem of identity theft. . .
[including that] many identity thieves receive short
terms of imprisonment or probation.” H.R. Rep. No.
108-528, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780 (emphasis added).
The
practices Congress focused on all involved the
intentional theft of the identification of known
individuals. Thus, the House Report emphasized
that because of the large number of complaints to the
Federal Trade Commission from victims whose
information was pilfered, “we must try to find new
ways to combat” not only such unsophisticated
practices as “dumpster diving,” but also theft of
“information that was originally collected for an
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authorized purpose,” including database hacking and
illicit employee access to confidential information.
Id. at 4-5. Indeed, all of the specific examples cited in
the House Report “involved defendants who . . . knew
the identification they used belonged to another.”
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1244 (describing that
all of the specific examples cited in the House Report
“involved defendants who . . . knew the identification
they used belonged to another”). And although some
examples may be clearer than others, see Godin, 2008
WL 2780646, at *7, at the very least none plainly
encompasses a case in which a defendant simply used
an identification number that, unbeknownst to him,
turned out to have been assigned to another person.
See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1245.
The distinction between theft and unknowing
misappropriation is not a technicality, but instead
goes to the core of what Congress found to be so
especially culpable as to warrant additional, and
quite severe, punishment as “aggravated identity
theft.” The focus on intentional theft illustrates that
Congress was principally concerned in this provision
not with addressing fraud, which is punished
severely elsewhere,9 but rather with recognizing the
additional level of culpability that arises when a
defendant knowingly seeks to use a means of
identification that belongs to another person and,
therefore, intentionally risks inflicting special harms
on the person whose identity the defendant steals.
9 For example, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, punishing
“Fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents,” are
punishable by up to a ten years’ imprisonment for a first
offense. Id. § 1546(a).
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Indeed, the legislative history focuses extensively on
that potential harm. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d
at 1243-44 (collecting examples).
Of course, an individual sometimes can be
harmed by accidental misappropriation of his means
of identification as well. But that does not change
the fact that the degree of a defendant’s culpability
turns most critically on the state of his intentions.10
Put simply, someone who intends to steal another’s
identity is worthy of greater punishment than one
who unintentionally picks an identification number
out of thin air that happens to match one already
issued to someone else. To be sure, both defendants
have engaged in culpable conduct in using a false
identification. But the purpose of the sentencing
enhancement in Section 1028A(a)(1) is to provide
additional punishment when that fraud also amounts
to identity theft, a concept commonly understood to
encompass the intentional taking of property known
to belong to another.
Applying the knowledge requirement to the “of
another person” element thus tracks the distinction
most relevant to culpability. The Government, on the
other hand, would mete out extraordinary
punishment not on the basis of anything the
10 Moreover, the risk of harm to the victim is more
significant when the misappropriation is intentional – a
defendant like petitioner, who uses false identification to secure
employment with no intention of stealing anyone’s identity,
surely is less dangerous than is a defendant who seeks out
Social Security numbers and other identification belonging to
real people, often in order to facilitate absconding with their
money or misusing their credit.
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defendant intended, but rather based on the random
happenstance that some defendants acquire Social
Security numbers that happen not to have been
assigned yet, while others are not so lucky.
3. Even if it is possible to hypothesize a Congress
that would have intended such a result, such
speculation is an insufficient basis for resolving a
textual ambiguity in a criminal statute against the
defendant. “When interpreting a criminal statute,”
this Court does not “play the part of a mind reader.”
United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2008)
(plurality opinion). Instead, in choosing between
plausible constructions of a criminal statute, “it is
appropriate, before we choose the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should have
spoken in language that is clear and definite.”
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
when “Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of
imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Bell
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
In this case, at the very least, consideration of the
structure, history and purposes of Section
1028A(a)(1) does not decisively resolve the textual
ambiguity in favor of the Government.11 The rule of
lenity
therefore
requires
rejection
of
the
11 Indeed, none of the circuits accepting the Government’s
view have done so on the strength of the legislative history,
strcture, or purposes of the statute. Instead, all have found –
incorrectly – that the statutory language was unambiguous. See
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 608;
Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217.
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Government’s interpretation
petitioner’s conviction.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.
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